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NEO-CARTESIANISM AND 
THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL SUFFERING 
Michael J. Murray and Glenn Ross 
The existence and extent of animal suffering provides grounds for a serious 
evidential challenge to theism. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, this 
strain of natural atheology has taken on substantially greater significance. In 
this essay we argue that there are at least four neo-Cartesian views on the na-
ture of animal minds which would serve to deflect this evidential challenge. 
What a book a devil's chaplain might write 
On the clumsy wasteful, blundering, low, and 
Horribly cruel works of nature! 
-Charles Darwin 
1. Introduction 
In the half century after the publication of the Origin of Species, Christian 
apologists who adopted the evolutionary account of biological origins were 
forced to grapple with how to explain the pervasiveness of animal suffer-
ing and death required by Darwin's view. As Darwin himself explained 
the problem, "the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout 
almost endless time" is apparently irreconcilable with the existence of a 
creator of "unbounded" goodness.! Traditional attempts to explain the re-
ality of animal suffering and death as consequences of the Fall appeared 
moot in the face of the mounting evidence that humans were late-comers 
in the evolutionary derby. 
However, these early attempts to address the problem of animal suf-
fering failed to provide a coherent and satisfying reply. Many were thus 
led to conclude, with Brooklyn's popular clergyman Henry Ward Beecher, 
that God's purposes in nature lay beyond our ken, and that "neither in 
Nature nor in Providence are His ways like our Ways."2 
In recent days, the problem of animal suffering in the context of theod-
icy has received almost no attention. This absence is especially conspicu-
ous when one notes that in the most discussed recent argument for athe-
ism from the existence of evil, William Rowe employs an imagined case 
of animal suffering as the central example.3 Rowe presents the image of 
a deer, burned in a forest fire, dying slowly and in great pain, alone in 
the woods. What kind of God, he asks, could possibly permit prevent-
able suffering in an animal that lacks moral responsibility, if the suffer-
ing serves no purpose? If the existence of pointless evil is incompatible 
with the existence of the God of orthodox theism, then if it is reasonable 
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to regard animal suffering as gratuitous, it is unreasonable to believe 
that such a God exists. Since the Darwinian picture of biological origins 
has now become firmly entrenched, this piece of natural atheology pro-
vides the critic of theism with an argument that deserves a serious and 
thoughtful reply. 
Of those proposed strategies that deal specifically with animal suffer-
ing and pain, some are based on the "standard view" of Descartes which 
includes, what John Cottingham has called the "monstrous thesis" that 
"animals are totally without feeling."4 On this standard view of Descartes, 
animals are mere automata and consequently possess only those charac-
teristics found in the rest of mechanistic nature. Non-human creatures are 
thereby excluded not only from having thought, reason, or consciousness, 
but also from having sensation of any kind." On this view, animals do 
not experience pain because they do not experience anything at all. They 
are, essentially, nothing but mobile machines. The yelps and squeals of 
animals are no more expressions of pain than are the creaks and groans of 
machinery in need of lubrication. On this view, since animal suffering is 
merely apparent, there is no evil left for the theist to explain. 
Despite its obvious advantages for explaining apparent evil, the "mon-
strous thesis" that animals are totally without feeling elicits strong nega-
tive reactions ranging from incredulity to moral outrage. Nonetheless, we 
will argue that various defensible neo-Cartesian accounts can be formu-
lated and put to work in addressing the problem of evil raised by apparent 
animal suffering. 
II. The Theist's Task in Confronting Evil 
Before we venture forward, it is worth pausing briefly to get clear on ex-
actly what we take ourselves to be doing in addressing this challenge. 
What is the theist up to when trying to "explain" the existence of evil? 
In general, what the theist is up to is confronting an evidential challenge 
implicit in a question of the form, "Why does God permit X?" where X is a 
type of event the occurrence of which appears incompatible with or which 
makes unlikely the existence of the God of traditional theism. In this con-
text, X is a type of evil, or more narrowly, an apparently pointless type of 
evil, which appears to provide a bit of evidence that is either flatly incon-
sistent with the truth of theism, or which makes theism improbable.6 
Let's consider these in turn. For those who aim to argue that X is incon-
sistent with theism, the theist need offer only what Alvin Planting a has 
deemed a "defense." A "defense" is a claim which is compos sible with 
theism and which entails the existence of tokens of X. For its purposes, a 
defense need not be plausible or even true. It need only show how God 
and tokens of X might possibly coexist. 
However, arguments aiming to show the incompatibility of God and 
evil are no longer taken very seriously. What are taken seriously, rather, 
are arguments which aim to show that evil makes the existence of God 
implausible. And defense alone is useless in the face of these challenges 
since showing the mere compossibility of the existence of God and evil 
does nothing to show that the existence of God is not unlikely given the 
reality of evil. 
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What then is required? The theist might hope, perhaps, to be able to 
provide the whole and sober truth about why God permits evil. Plantinga 
labels this sort of response a "theodicy." Theodicy would, of course, suf-
fice to show that the existence of evil does not make the existence of God 
unlikely. But constructing a theodicy is, as David Lewis, points out "too 
hard."7 And what is more, it is not necessary. 
Those who have tried to find a middle way between defense and theo-
dicy are not in complete agreement about what is necessary. Lewis claims 
that we need to develop "hypotheses that are at least somewhat plausi-
ble, at least to the Christian,"S which show how evil provides a neces-
sary means for certain goods. Yet this standard also seems too high. It 
would, of course, be nice if the theist could devise such hypotheses. But 
the theist's task in this context is to preserve the reasonability of theistic 
belief in the face of the apparent evidential challenge raised by X. In such 
a situation the theist may freely admit that she is not aware of any plau-
sible hypotheses which turn back the evidential challenge raised by X. Still, 
there might be a variety of reasons which are, for example, true for all she 
knows and which are such that if they were true, they would constitute 
good explanations for evil (that is they would be consistent with theism 
and would explain why the types of evil would be necessary for securing 
outweighing goods). 
In light of considerations similar to these, Peter van Inwagen has ar-
gued that what is required is rather "a story according to which God and 
suffering of the sort contained in the actual world both exist, and which 
is such that ... there is no reason to think that it is false, a story that is not 
surprising on the hypothesis that God exists."9 But this standard turns out 
to be too high still. To see why, consider the following variation on a story 
used by van Inwagen in discussing this issue. Suppose that Jane wishes 
to defend the character of Richard III and that she must contend with evi-
dence that Richard murdered two princes in the Tower. What is the evi-
dence? Perhaps the following: a foreign spy reports to Jane that he saw 
Richard issue the death warrant, the two princes were plotting a threat to 
Richard's throne which he was seeking to thwart, and Richard was known 
to be in court at the Tower immediately before the murders were carried 
out. All of these provide Jane with "some reason" to think that Richard 
had the princes murdered. Still, Jane might accept the following claims: 
the foreign spy was seeking to undermine Richard's character, Richard 
had foresworn killing rogue princes, and certain guards at the Tower were 
seeking to damage Richard's reputation. In light of that, Jane considers 
the possibility that the guards, knowing Richard had recently held court 
at the Tower, murdered the princes to implicate him. Jane does not know 
this to be the case, it is not rendered plausible by what she knows, and she 
even has some reason to believe it false. Still, on the assumption that she 
has some good reason to trust that Richard has a good character in the first 
place, this conjunction of hypotheses allows her to maintain the reason-
ability of her belief in Richard's good character since she is not justified or 
warranted in rejecting it in light of the totality of the claims she accepts. 
Similarly, to deflect the evidential challenge posed by evil, the theist 
need only construct hypotheses which she is not justified or warranted 
in rejecting in light of the claims she accepts. In order to avoid confusion, 
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we will not label such hypotheses "theodicies" or "defenses." The new 
category deserves a new name. For the remainder of this essay we will call 
such a hypothesis a causa dei (or "CD" for short), the Latin equivalent of 
the Greek "theodicy."l0 
III. A More Subtle Reading of Descartes 
On the view standardly attributed to Descartes, animals are mere uncon-
scious automata. The numerous critics of this view have rejected it for a 
variety of reasons. Some see it as inviting moral atrocities against animals. 
Some see it as inconsistent with what we know about our own evolution-
ary origins and our neuroanatomical similarity to other animal species. 
Still others find it an affront to common sense. 
While the unconscious automata view strikes many as implausible, 
there are hints that this was not the only view of animals' mentality con-
sidered by Descartes. There is no doubt that in some texts Descartes likens 
animals to mere machines. For example, in a letter to Mersenne of 1640 he 
writes that "For in my view, pain exists only in the understanding. What I 
do is explain all the external movements which accompany feeling in us; 
in animals it is these movements alone which occur, and not pain in a strict 
sense."]] The view presented here was widely adopted by later Cartesians 
such as Arnauld and Malebranche and used for specifically theodicean 
purposes. These later Cartesians argued that divine goodness requires 
that animals not actually feel the pain that their behaviors appeared to sig-
nal, and the Cartesian position supplied an easy route to that conclusion. 
A closer examination of some of the texts of Descartes later career, how-
ever indicate that he may have held, or may have come to hold, a more 
subtle position than the one attributed to him by his successors. In these 
later texts Descartes appears to allow for the reality of animal sensation, 
while denying that animals have "thought." On this view, "sensation" can 
be regarded as a function of the corporeal mental capacities, while thought 
is accomplished through the powers of the immaterial mind alone. 
This fits in well with the account we find in Meditation Six, where Des-
cartes provides an argument for the reality of the external world that es-
sentially relies on a broadly Aristotelian psychology. For Aristotelians, 
the mental capacities were parceled out among the sensitive, imaginative, 
and intellectual "parts" of the soul. Sensitive and imaginative powers 
permitted facility with particulars, whereas intellectual powers permit-
ted, among other things, awareness of universals, apperception, and the 
ability to deliberate. 12 Aristotelians attributed all three sorts of powers to 
human beings, while admitting only sensitive and imaginative powers for 
animals. Further, they argued that sensitive and imaginative powers were 
corporeal powers, meaning the activities of these souls were carried out 
via the operation of corporeal organs, in this case via the sensory faculties 
and the brain. Thus, while animals had sensitive and imaginative powers, 
these powers were exercised wholly through the operations of the activity 
of the corporeal organ.13 The intellectual powers, on the other hand, do not 
operate via the activity of a corporeal organ. Although the soul of a human 
being might be embodied, some of the functions of the human mind went 
on without the direct involvement of the matter of the substance. 14 Thus, 
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Aquinas could say, "If the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of 
things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intel-
lect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its posses-
sion. So if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only 
of particulars. And this is patently false. Thus, no intellect is bodily."ls 
In the Sixth Meditatioll, Descartes similarly argues that the powers of 
sensation and imagination are not part of my essence, since they do not 
presuppose thought, and thereby concludes that these powers inhere in 
some corporeal substance to which my soul is intimately connected.16 On 
this view, sensation and imaginative capacities are carried out through a 
corporeal organ (i.e., the brain alone or in conjunction with certain sensory 
neural pathways) and thus sensation and memory can be present even in 
beings lacking immaterial souls. This view seems to allow that animals 
have both sensation and memory, while lacking the suite of mental capaci-
ties grounded in the intellect (i.e., awareness of universals, apperception, 
and freedom). As a result, Descartes' views appear to permit animals to 
have the same first order sensitive and imaginative states that humans 
have, including pain. 
To attribute this view to Descartes on the evidence of the argument 
from Meditation Six would be a stretch. But in fact, some of his late cor-
respondence gives further reason to believe that Descartes held just such 
a view. In a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle in 1646 Descartes writes, 
"All the things which dogs, horses, and monkeys are taught to perform 
are only expressions of their fear, their hope, their joy; and consequently 
they can be performed without thought."17 Here Descartes attributes fear, 
hope, and joy to animals while denying that they are capable of thought, 
i.e., the activity characteristic of the immaterial soul alone. Likewise, in 
a 1649 letter to More, Descartes goes so far as to insist that his view only 
denies thought to animals, and not life or sensation, "For brevity's sake I 
here omit the other reasons for denying thought to animals. Please note 
that I am speaking of thought, and not of life or sensation. I do not deny 
life to animals since I regard it as simply in the heat of the heart; and I do 
not deny sensation, in so far as it depends on bodily organ."l8 
Putting the pieces together, we might understand Descartes' view in 
the following way. What animals lack is only those capacities conferred 
by the intellectual soul, such as the ability to think about universals, to 
reflect on one's own mental states, to deliberate, etc. On this view, while 
it might be true that animals see, hear, and smell, they are not capable of 
reflecting on those first order mental states, and thus of regarding them 
as pleasureable or not. So, while they may hear the symphony, they never 
say to themselves "Wow, that was wonderful!" since they cannot engage 
in a reflective awareness of their own sensory states. 
IV Four neo-Cartesian Alternatives 
On the more subtle interpretation of Descartes, higher-order cognitive ca-
pacities, not first-order sensory ones, form the basis for morally significant 
distinctions between our conscious lives and the lives of other creatures. 
We have seen Descartes ground these cognitive differences in ontology. As 
a substance dualist, who saw mind and matter as distinct substances, he 
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could conceive of thought as a power of the immaterial mind alone, leav-
ing the powers of sensation to inhere in corporeal substance. Yet, we need 
not presuppose a Cartesian ontology in order to fashion a neo-Cartesian CD. 
Indeed, contemporary non-Cartesian theories of consciousness provide 
the resources for fashioning several alternative neo-Cartesian CD's for the 
problem of animal suffering. 
Classical Cartesian theodicy founders on the implausibility of the thesis 
that animals are unconscious automata. Yet, contemporary philosophical 
discussions of consciousness agree on at least this: there are many differ-
ent notions of consciousness. So it is open to the neo-Cartesian to affirm 
that animals are conscious, in an ordinary sense of 'conscious,' while de-
nying they are conscious in yet another ordinary sense of the term. 
Obviously, animals are alive and often awake. They are not unconscious 
in the way rocks are. Animals can have occurrent mental states that playa 
role in the control of their bodily movements and behavior. These are fea-
tures of any organism that is sentient, and clearly, some animals are some-
times conscious in this sense. Let us call this sort of consciousness, creature 
cOllsciousness.19 The particular occurrent mental states of sentient creatures 
can themselves be called consciolls when they are states of awareness of 
something else. Let us call this relational notion of the consciousness of a 
mental state access consciousness.20 Insofar as a housefly can accurately rep-
resent a state of affairs external to itself, it has access to its surroundings 
and is consciously aware of what is nearby. 
Most philosophical discussions of consciousness, however, have fo-
cused on a third, more mysterious conception of consciousness. This sort 
of consciousness involves the peculiarly subjective or phenomenal char-
acter of experience, the particular way it is like to have certain sorts of 
experiences, or the qualitative aspect of sensory awareness (' qualia'). Let 
us call this sort of consciousness phenomenal consciousness and ascribe such 
consciousness both to particular mental states and to the subjects of such 
mental states. 
Plainly, a creahlre can be in a state of access consciousness without 
being in a state of phenomenal consciousness. A familiar example is the 
common experience of driving on psychological "autopilot," when one is 
not aware (phenomenally) that one is driving, even though one is plainly 
aware (in the creature and access senses) of the road ahead, as evidenced 
by the fact that one would appropriately respond to any unanticipated 
and unusual interruptions. 
The phenomena of "blindsight" and" deaf-hearing" provide other more 
commonly cited examples of the distinction between these two types of 
consciousness. Patients who have sustained damage to their primary vi-
sual cortex may retain the ability to detect, discriminate, and localize vi-
sual stimuli presented in the areas of their visual field in which they report 
that they are subjectively blind. Such "blindsighted" patients report that 
they are no longer able to see, and yet they are capable of giving correct 
motor responses to changes in their environment that could only be de-
tected through the visual modalities. In a natural sense, they are conscious 
of what they think they do not see (they have some access to the external 
information), while in another sense they are blissfully unaware, for they 
are not phenomenally conscious of this access,2! 
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Patients with corresponding damage to the auditory cortex similarly 
report being unable to hear, while nonetheless showing a capacity to de-
tect, localize, and exhibit appropriate autonomic reactions to sound. As 
with blindsighted patients, it is natural to regard these patients as deaf 
when we consider phenomenal consciousness, while acknowledging that 
they have mental states which display auditory access consciousness.22 
Using these distinctions we are now in a position to formulate four pro-
posals for a distinction between human and non-human consciousness. 
Each of the four proposals, if true, would have the moral significance nec-
essary to sustain a neo-Cartesian CD with respect to animal pain. 
The first proposal exploits the distinction between access consciousness 
and phenomenal consciousness: 
1. Many non-human creatures are conscious inasmuch as they are 
alive, awake and have sensations. These creatures have mental states 
that give them perceptual access to features of their environment in 
a way that allows them to make the requisite discriminations nec-
essary for psychological control over their behavior. Yet, unlike the 
sensory states possessed by humans, the mechanisms whereby these 
organisms have access to the world lack any phenomenal charac-
ter whatsoever. There is an intrinsic difference between the sensory 
states of non-humans and humans in this phenomenal respect. 
On this proposal, the pain of animals is blind pain, inasmuch as the crea-
ture has no phenomenal sense of the pain, even though it can have infor-
mational access to a harmful situation. 
Critics of classical Cartesian CD are not likely to be impressed. Though 
the proposal does not characterize animals as unconscious automata in the 
creature or access senses, it does seem to make them unconscious automata 
in the phenomenal sense. If deer pain is intrinsically different from a hu-
man pain in this proposed way, then deer and other creatures turn out to 
be phenomenally unconscious zombies. To speak of pain in such creatures 
would be to speak of mental states that are merely similar in function but 
intrinsically different in a respect that critics might well regard as the most 
fundamentally important sense of being conscious. 
Neo-Cartesianism of this first sort sees non-human sensory states as 
lacking phenomenal character and regards this as an intrinsic difference 
between sensory states in humans and other creatures. A second neo-
Cartesian CD could detach the second part of that claim. Those pressing 
this second CD could persist in maintaining that the pain sensations of 
other creatures lack phenomenal properties, but maintain that this does 
not mark an intrinsic difference between pain states in humans and pain 
states in other creatures. The key to this proposal is to deny that phenom-
enal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states. Just such a claim 
is a consequence of a contemporary theory of consciousness with consid-
erable currency. 
On strictly functionalist theories of the mind, all psychological proper-
ties are representational or functional properties. It is thus natural for func-
tionalists to regard the difference between a state's being phenomenally 
conscious or not to tum upon relational facts about the state, and not upon 
intrinsic, qualitative features of the state itself. For example, according to 
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Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories, a mental state's being conscious 
consists in having an accompanying conceptual mental state that repre-
sents the first state as its intentional object.23 This general theory of state 
consciousness can then be employed to generate a theory of phenomenal 
consciousness on which a phenomenally conscious mental state is a state 
with non-conceptual content, which is the object of a higher-order inten-
tional state, and which causes that state non-inferentially.24 
Our neo-Cartesian theodicist, buoyed by the prospect of being fashion-
ably up-to-date in the philosophy of mind (generally a rather unfamiliar 
feeling for Cartesians), is now in a position to formulate a second proposal: 
2. For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires 
an accompanying higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that 
state as its intentional object. This HOT must be a thought that one 
is, oneself, in that first-order state. Only humans have the cognitive 
faculties required to form the conception of themselves being in a 
first-order state that one must have in order to have a HOT. 
On this second proposal, no intrinsic difference in states of pain or other 
sensory states grounds the phenomenal difference. Instead, the phenom-
enal properties tum on the extrinsic features of the state, viz., whether the 
creatures is aware of itself as being in that first-order state. There is noth-
ing it is like for such a creature to be in pain, not because the state of pain 
in that creature is intrinsically different, but because the creature lacks the 
relevant access to itself and to that state of pain. 
Is neo-Cartesian theodicy available only to those who accept func-
tionalist theories of phenomenal consciousness? Indeed not. Those who 
think phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic qualitative feature of 
first-order states can concede that this is a further similarity between hu-
mans and other creatures while persisting in the belief that only humans 
have higher-order access to these first-order states. Thus, we have a third 
neo-Cartesian proposal: 
3. Some non-human creatures have states that have intrinsic phenom-
enal qualities analogous to those possessed by humans when they 
are in states of pain. These creatures lack, however, any higher-
order states of being aware of themselves as being in first-order 
states. They have no access to the fact that they are having a par-
ticular feeling, though they are indeed having it. Since phenomenal 
properties of states of pain and other sensory states are intrinsic to 
the states themselves, there is no difference on this score between 
humans and other creatures.25 
One might object to this view by arguing that there is moral disvalue in 
a world in which there are many organisms possessing mental states that 
have phenomenal features characteristic of painful sensations. Access to 
these states, the critic might contend, is irrelevant to whether it is bad to be 
in the state itself. Clearly, if a state is intrinsically bad, it is not made better 
merely in virtue of the fact that the creature does not know about it. 
The objection misses the mark. For defenders of this third proposal, no 
less than those defending the second, can plausibly respond that so long 
as an animal lacks the higher-order access, so long as it cannot represent 
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itself as being in a state of pain, there is nothing about its situation that is 
of intrinsic moral disvalue. For lacking any such access, there is simply no 
victim, no subject for whom it can be said that there is a way it is like for it 
to be in such a state of pain.26 
Does neo-Cartesian CD require that other creatures lack any higher-
order access to states of pain? Not at all. For, even if an animal has higher-
order access to a first-order state of pain, it would lack any moral disvalue 
if the animal did not find the state to be undesirable. Such a mental state 
might bear some similarity to the conscious experience of persons with a 
damaged or absent prefrontal cortices. Individuals who have undergone 
a prefrontal lobotomy, for example, have reported an awareness of famil-
iar pains but paradoxically insisted that they no longer found the pain to 
be undesirable or unpleasant. They claim the pain "feels" the same, even 
though it no longer bothers them. As a result, creatures of this sort have 
first order pain states, and second order awareness of them. But because 
they lack the capacity to regard those states as undesirable, such creatures 
do not suffer because of their pain. 
""Ie then have available a fourth neo-Cartesian proposal: 
4. Most creatures lack the cognitive faculties required to be in a higher-
order state of recognizing themselves to be in a first-order state of 
pain. Those non-human creatures that can on occasion achieve a sec-
ond-order access to their first-order states of pain, nonetheless do not 
have the capacity to regard that second-order state as undesirable.27 
This fourth view faces at least one immediately obvious objection: if ani-
mal pain were understood on this model, then they would be incapable of 
properly motivating the sorts of avoidance behaviors pain typically elicit. 
After all, if the prey did not find the pain of being eaten by a predator un-
desirable, why would it struggle to get free? 
This objection rests on the assumption that animal behavior is moti-
vated, at least sometimes, by the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the 
animal's mental states. But there is no reason to think this is true. On evo-
lutionary grounds, it is reasonable to suppose that if animals exhibit cer-
tain behaviors when they are exposed to potentially injurious (noxious) 
stimuli, they do so because reacting this way has proven to be adaptive. 
The adaptiveness of the behavior is utterly detachable from any feelings 
of pleasantness of unpleasantness that may attend the mental state that 
generates the behavior. Thus, if the prey seeks to escape the predator, to 
cower, to whimper, etc., it does so because such behaviors have, for what-
ever reason, proven to be adaptive or to be related to adaptive capacities 
the organism possesses. But this is true whether or not the mediating men-
tal states are regarded as pleasant or not. As we will see in the next section, 
even humans often exhibit pain-avoidance behaviors in the presence of 
noxious stimuli without (or prior to) feeling the unpleasantness attending 
the noxious stimulus. This is true even in some cases where the person, in 
retrospect, takes the unpleasantness of the stimulus to be the explanation 
for his action. For example, we know that when we withdraw our hand 
from a hot object, the behavior is initiated before the painful sensation 
is felt, even though most would claim that they moved their hand away 
because "it hurt."28 
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Common to all of these neo-Cartesian proposals is the thesis that non-
human creatures lack some psychological capacity that grounds a morally 
significant distinction adequate for a CD. The successful neo-Cartesian 
CD must steer around a rock of Scylla and not exaggerate the psychologi-
cal difference between humans and non-humans. Yet, it must also avoid a 
whirlpool of Charybdis by not leaving unexplained states in animals that 
are simply not good. 
Constructing a successful CD requires that the components be such 
that we are not justified or warranted in rejecting them in light of what 
we accept. However, some might argue that the neo-Cartesian positions 
set out above fail to get over even this low hurdle, since some things we 
accept, or ought to accept, do warrant their rejection. The first thing we ac-
cept, or ought to accept, is that the evidence of ethology, neuroscience, and 
evolution render these descriptions of animal mentality untenable. The 
second thing we accept, or ought to accept, is that animals deserve moral 
consideration, and the neo-Cartesian CD's described above preclude such 
consideration. Below we respond to these concerns. 
V Empirical Objections to the neo-Cartesian CD 
In section IV we take ourselves to have shown that there are a variety or 
positions defended in contemporary philosophy of mind which would 
deliver the distinctions required to sustain a neo-Cartesian CD. But one 
might wonder if evidence from outside of philosophy might undercut the 
neo-Cartesian picture. If the known facts of science, for example, were 
inconsistent with these neo-Cartesian views, this would make it inconsis-
tent with our acceptances and thus mandate its rejection. And one might 
suppose that there would be strong evidence from cognitive ethology, 
neuroscience, and evolution to rule out the neo-Cartesian position. In this 
section we try to address this concern ill brief. 
Ethology is the study of animal behavior in a way that pays special 
heed to the importance of ecological and evolutionary considerations. 
Cognitive ethology looks specifically at the extent to which animal behav-
ior might best be explained in terms that attribute cognitive mental states 
to animals. Fundamental to the standpoint of the cognitive ethologist are 
the claims that animal behavior is profitably explained by postulating 
these inner mental states, and that, as with humans, the behavior of other 
organisms is often best understood in terms of their information process-
ing capacities. 
Those who are attracted to cognitive ethology as a tool for understand-
ing animal behavior, are attracted because of its apparent success in ex-
plaining the apparently thoughtful behavior of animals. But it is worth 
noting at the outset that it is an open question whether the success of these 
explanations require that we actually attribute the cognitive states to the 
animal. As David DeGrazia notes29 we can distinguish two species of cog-
nitive ethology: strong and weak. Weak Cognitive Ethology (WCE) recog-
nizes the utility of explaining and predicting animal behavior in cognitive 
terms, but does not go so far as to actually attribute the mental states to the 
animals. On WCE, we can consider animals and their behavior to be analo-
gous to chess-playing computers and their behavior. We can all recognize 
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the utility of explaining the behavior of the computer by saying things 
like "It is trying to fend off the challenge of the queen" or "It is trying to 
lure the queen side rook" without going all the way to actually attributing 
beliefs, desires, and intentions to the computer. The friend of WCE adopts 
this same stance towards explaining animal behavior.30 Strong Cognitive 
Ethology (SCE) on the other hand, uses the same explanatory strategies, 
but goes further by attributing the cognitive states to the organism. Of 
course, simply assuming the truth of SCE would be to beg the question 
against at least the advocates of our first neo-Cartesian CD. SCE critics of 
neo-Cartesianism will need independent arguments for their views. 
Second, even if we did think that there were overriding reasons to ac-
cept SCE, it is an open question what implications this would have con-
cerning the sort of consciousness that is central in neo-Cartesian CDs. In 
the first three CDs what matters is the presence of absence of phenomenal 
consciousness arising from second order mental states. In the fourth CD 
what matters is the capacity of the organism to form reflective pro or can 
attitudes towards such second order mental states. Do the explanations 
invoked by SCE require or suggest that animals have these sorts of capaci-
ties as well? It is not immediately obvious that they would, since these ex-
planations typically invoke only beliefs and desires, and it is not at all clear 
that beliefs and desires depend on such second order mental states.31 
If, however, we had some sense of what mental capacities essentially in-
volved these sorts of second order states, and we had some behavioral rea-
son for attributing those mental capacities to animals, then we would have 
reason to attribute these mental states as well. At least some advocates 
of SCE think that there is little reason to attribute such conscious states 
to animals. The prominent primatologist and advocate of SCE, Gordon 
Gallup, Jr., argues that we have no reason to attribute second order men-
tal states to anything other than humans and other humanoid primates.32 
Gallup contends that the only sure sign that animals have awareness of 
their own mental states is the presence of self-concepts. If the animal has 
the capacity to conceive of itself, it can thus think of itself and thereby 
have an awareness of itself. If it lacks this capacity, it lacks awareness of 
itself. Gallup claims, "Either you are aware of being aware or you are un-
aware of being aware, and the latter is tantamount to being unconscious. 
The sleepwalker is sufficiently aware to navigate and avoid colliding with 
obstacles, but unaware of being aware .... If a species fails to behave in 
ways that suggest it is aware of its own existence, then why should we as-
sume it is aware of what it is doing?"" 
Gallup has famously argued for the presence of such self-awareness 
in certain organisms using evidence from experiments which involved 
placing a red dot on the foreheads of mirror trained primates and not-
ing that, when viewing their images in the mirrors, the primates would 
immediately touch the spot on their forehead, signaling that the primate 
recognized the mirror image as an image of itself. Gallup takes this be-
havior as evidence that the primate recognizes that it is seeing "itself" in 
the mirror. It is worth considering however, whether such experiments 
show that even these primates have self-awareness of the sort relevant 
for neo-Cartesian CD. Gallup shows here only that some animals have 
the capacity to recognize certain bodies as their own. This is a form of 
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self-awareness, but it is surely different from having second order aware-
ness of one's own mental states. 
Are there other less stingy ways of reading the behavioral evidence 
such that the evidence provides good reason for attributing the needed 
type(s) of second order states to animals? As a first attempt, one might 
simply argue that pain related behaviors themselves suffice for such an 
attribution. But as we have argued earlier, the empirical evidence from 
phenomena such as blindsight, deaf-hearing and the like make it clear we 
cannot generally infer the existence of second order awareness from be-
havior in this simple fashion. In addition, since we know that pain related 
behaviors are not always to be explained in ways that require appeal to 
second order awareness of pain states, there is no straightforward way to 
infer one from the other. Many simple organisms exhibit behaviors such 
as recoiling from potentially injurious (noxious) stimuli without any pain 
quale. This is true of microorganisms, snails, jellyfish, etc. What is more, 
there is strong evidence that, in many cases, pain related behaviors in hu-
man beings are not intrinsically connected with the conscious awareness of 
pain states. First, there are well-documented cases of human beings dis-
playing both physiological and behavioral evidence indicative of experi-
encing pain, while the patients report not actually feeling pain.34 Second, it 
is clear that in many cases pain behaviors are not caused in any way by the 
qualitative mental states that accompany the noxious stimulus. In cases of 
simple pain avoidance, such as withdrawing a hand from a hot surface, it 
has been firmly demonstrated that the pain related behavior precedes the 
conscious awareness of pain, as noted in section IIp5 
Still, one might argue, we know that even if jellyfish lack second order 
awareness of pain, we do not. As a result, the capacity for such aware-
ness appears at some point in evolutionary history. If we can discover the 
physical basis for such awareness, then we can perhaps discern which or-
ganisms actually experience pain in the way that we do. We will return to 
this claim below when we consider the neurological objection. 
Although the behavioral evidence from pain avoidance does not pro-
vide the critic with what she needs, some have argued that the behavioral 
evidence provides a more direct line of attack, at least against the first 
three neo-Cartesian CD's. These first three CD's depend essentially on the 
fact that animals lack a second order awareness of their own mental states. 
Depending on the view, this lack entails either that the animals have no 
phenomenal mental states at all or that they lack access to the phenomenal 
character of their mental states. Perhaps we might be able to make an em-
pirical case for the implausibility of these views by showing that at least 
some organisms have the capacity for second order awareness of their 
own mental states. Is there any evidence that animals have such second 
order awareness? 
It is worth noting at the outset that very few behaviors seem to re-
quire such consciousness awareness. As Bob Bermond notes, U almost no 
human capacity requires consciousness, e.g., conditioning, acquisition of 
complex procedural knowledge, learning of natural and artificial gram-
mars, breakthroughs in physics and mathematics, solving equations, and 
learning processes and decisions which steer our behavior in daily situ-
ations."36 However, two sorts of behaviors seem especially suggestive of 
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such second-order awareness. First, apparently deceptive behavior seems 
to indicate that animals are aware of the mental states of others, imply-
ing a general capacity for "awareness of mental states." For example, Jane 
Goodall has described behavior in which chimpanzees appear to go to 
great lengths to avoid looking at, and sometimes even obscuring, other-
wise unnoticed fruit while dominant males are present, and then going on 
to eat it after the others leave.37 Second, animals sometimes seem to show 
a more direct awareness of the first order mental states of others. For ex-
ample, in one suggestive experiment, researchers describe chimpanzees 
removing the blindfold from a trainer's face in order to lead him to a box 
filled with food which only the trainer could open.38 The results seem to 
indicate that the chimps have an awareness of what the trainer's men-
tal states would be like with the blindfold on, thus displaying a general 
awareness of mental states. 
Yet while such evidence is suggestive, it is not decisive. Behavior of the 
first sort can be explained by simple conditioning. Past instances in which 
the chimp looked at or failed to obscure the fruit would have led to loss 
of reward. The second case is a bit more interesting, but still not decisive. 
In this case, for all we know, the chimp relies on its awareness that eyes 
are necessary for proper navigation. Seeing the blindfold on the trainer, 
and recognizing that this prevents the trainer from navigating, leads the 
chimp to act as it does. This is the sort of inference we would draw if, for 
example, we saw a chimp carry a nonambulatory trainer to the locked 
box. We would not infer that the chimp knows what it feels like to be un-
able to walk. We would simply assume that the chimp has the capacity 
to recognize that trainers without legs can't walk. It is not clear that any 
stronger conclusion is warranted in the case of the blindfold. 
If considerations of animal behavior are not decisive, perhaps neurosci-
ence and evolution will raise more serious objections. Unfortunately, the 
evidence against the neo-Cartesian CD from these quarters is thin. Neu-
roscience is of limited use since we simply do not know what explains 
phenomenal or second order consciousness at the neural level. While a 
number of interesting experiments have been done on this front, none has 
delivered any decisive positive information. We do know that there is no 
consciousness "lobe." The neural capacities which underlie consciousness 
are distributed across various perceptual systems and seem to depend on 
specific forms of neural structural and dynamic complexity, rather than 
the presence of a distinct structure. As a result, losing the capacity for phe-
nomenal consciousness in one perceptual modality might leave the others 
full intact.39 While some experimental work has been done in an attempt to 
discover exactly what the neural correlates to phenomenal consciousness 
might be, none have been successful.40 As a result, the neural evidence will 
not be of much value for assessing these neo-Cartesian views. 
This fact however, not only shows us that the neuroscientific critique of 
neo-Cartesian CD's fait but also shows us why the evolutionary critique 
will have a hard time succeeding as well. We can press as hard as we like 
on the fact that there is continuity and similarity between the peripheral 
and central nervous systems of humans and their evolutionary neighbors. 
But since we don't know what sorts of similarities and continuities are 
relevant in this case, these observations can do no work for the critic. 
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One might try to narrow the target somewhat here, arguing that while 
we perhaps do not know enough about the neurology of phenomenal con-
sciousness generally, we surely know enough about the neural basis of 
pain perception (i.e., nociception) to be able to say that the experience of 
some animals in pain must closely resemble normal human nociception. 
But once again, this is simply not the case. What we do know is that many 
organisms are capable of perceiving noxious stimuli, and are capable of 
producing adaptive behaviors in response to their pains. We know that 
in many cases, as described earlier, pain behaviors are not caused by the 
qualia associated with nociception. Thus, nociception and pain related be-
havior do not require second order phenomenal consciousness of pain. 
What we do know about nociception thereby seems to leave room for the 
possibility of the first three CDs. 
What is more, we know enough about human pain perception to know 
that there is also room for our fourth CD. We know that, in the human 
case at least, nociception involves more than one perceptual pathway. For 
example, there is at least one pathway that detects the cognitive signifi-
cance of the noxious situation, and a second that detects the "emotional" 
or affective importance of the situation. The latter of these two central-
ly involves the right neocortex and the prefrontal cortex, the part of the 
mammalian brain structure which appears last in evolutionary history. 
The distinctness of these two pathways is important and warrants some 
brief reflection. 
There are three types of cases which display the nature of the distinct 
pathways. First, as we have already seen in the discussion of the fourth 
CD, are cases in which lobotomized patients report that they continue to 
sense or experience pain, but without disliking or being displeased by the 
pain. These patients report that they understand that the pain sensations 
signal noxious stimuli, but they simply are not motivated to do anything 
to rid themselves of the sensations. For example, such patients uniformly 
refuse analgesics which would eliminate or alleviate the sensations.41 Sim-
ilarly, patients with induced loss of function in the prefrontal cortex often 
display a generalized indifference to the threat of pain and other poten-
tially negative consequences of their behavior. As a result, these patients 
not only engage in practices which knowingly involve noxious stimuli, 
but they will act in ways that harm their own long term interests (spend-
ing money recklessly, engaging in reckless patterns of social behavior). In 
all of these cases, the patients report that they understand the negative 
consequences of their behavior, but they are not motivated to do anything 
to stop those consequences from occurring.42 
Finally, there is evidence of these distinct perceptual pathways aris-
ing from a comparison of a pair of disorders: prosopagnosia and Capgras 
Syndrome. Prosopagnosiacs lack facial recognition capacities. What is re-
markable however, is that these individuals show clear autonomic and 
other physiological signs typical in cases where people see things that are 
familiar. The result seems to be that while they lack the relevant cognitive 
perceptual capacity, their ability to generate the appropriate affect is un-
diminished.43 Those with Capgras Syndrome, on the other hand, are able 
to recognize ordinary objects and faces as being identical from one en-
counter to the next. But unlike the prosopagnosiac, they lack appropriate 
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physiological responses to these objects. Typically, when one sees one's 
parents, children, spouse, etc., there follows a cascade of physiological re-
sponses characteristic of recognition of something familiar. Those suffer-
ing from Caprgras syndrome seem unable to process the affective impor-
tance of the situation. The result, interestingly, is that those suffering from 
the disorder mistakenly infer that the familiar looking object or person is 
in fact a substitute. They report that someone looking just like their parent 
or spouse is acting as an imposter.44 
None of this shows, of course that non-human animals have the cogni-
tive nociceptive capacities while lacking the affective ones. But this evi-
dence does make clear that the two pathways are distinct, and that the 
affective pathway that leads us to regard noxious stimuli as bad or un-
pleasant essentially involves brain structures, specifically the prefrontal 
cortex, which most animals lack. 
VI. The Ethical Treatment of Animals 
Are there disturbing ethical consequences for neo-Cartesian CD's? Must 
those who deny the reality of animal suffering find nothing objectionable 
in any possible treatment of non-human creatures? Apparently many Car-
tesians accepted this implication with glee. Some report of Cartesians that, 
"They kicked about their dogs and dissected their cats without mercy, 
laughing at any compassion for them, and calling their screams the noise 
of breaking machinery."45 
Robert Wennberg alleges that, in the final analysis, a Cartesian theodicy 
is stuck with such consequences, and presents a stark choice for us: 
Indeed if we cannot join those particular followers of Descartes who 
"kicked about their dogs and dissected their cats without mercy ... " 
then we must part company with those who would seek to construct 
a theodicy based on a denial of animal pain.46 
Does the fact that we do not want to join the dog-kickers and cat-dissecters 
pose a problem for us as neo-Cartesians? There are at least three issues that 
need addressing. First, does the endorsement of a neo-Cartesian CD imply 
that one should regard any treatment of non-human creatures as morally 
permissible? Second, if animals cannot, in fact, suffer, does our treatment 
of them turn out to be morally inconsequential? Finally, do the hypotheses 
of neo-Cartesian CD's imply that non-human creatures have only instru-
mental value and lack any inherent worth? 
In addressing the first question, we would do well to recall what is 
required to endorse a CO. One must provide an answer to a question of 
the form "Why would the God of traditional theism permit X?" (where X 
is a type of event that appears to be gratuitously evil), an answer that one 
is not justified or warranted in rejecting given the claims one accepts. As 
neo-Cartesians, we need not claim to know, or even accept, the hypoth-
esis that non-human creatures never experience states that are intrinsi-
cally evil. We need only leave open the possibility that this is so, for all we 
accept. But in light of such a weak endorsement of neo-Cartesian thesis, 
we must admit that we do not know that animals never suffer, and that 
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it would be morally reckless to act as if we did. Normally, one ought not 
shoot at what is moving in the brush, unless one knows it is not a person. 
Similarly, one should not treat animals as if they do not suffer, unless one 
knows this is so. We have no such knowledge. 
Yet one might press further. Suppose some version of the neo-Cartesian 
CD turned out to be true. Does it follow that any treatment of animals is 
morally inconsequential? It does not. Kant famously denied that animals 
have intrinsic worth, while insisting that there can still be wrongful acts 
of cruelty to animals. He deems our duties to animals as indirect duties 
toward humanity. 
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of ser-
vice, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, 
but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which 
it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human 
feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is 
cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.47 
On Kant's account, then, cruelty to animals is wrong because it disposes 
us to harm other persons. Plainly, Kant has provided a morally relevant 
reason why we should not join those who wantonly beat dogs and dissect 
cats, and moreover a reason that is compatible with a neo-Cartesian theo-
dicy. This addresses the second issue by showing that neo-Cartesians need 
not view our treatment of animals as morally inconsequential. 
Nonetheless, some have argued that the Kantian response is insuffi-
cient by pressing the third issue. These critics argue that the Kantian view 
denies that animals have value or worth apart from their role in serving 
human ends and that, as a result, it does not accord them the sort of worth 
our moral judgments concerning them require. Surely, causing animals 
needless injury is wrong for reasons beyond the fact that it might lead 
one to treat one's neighbors with indifference or hostility. The moral judg-
ments we make about cases of apparent cruelty to animals seem to require 
that we take such mistreatment to be intrinsically wrong. Wennberg puts 
the objection to the Kantian response this way: 
[With the Kantian line] we end up with a radically truncated moral 
belief. For one thing, the action of beating a dog with a baseball bat 
is no longer appalling in-and-of-itself; ... [thus] whenever we are 
reasonably convinced that the beating of the pet (or non-pet) will not 
have negative secondary effects we can beat without restraint.48 
Can neo-Cartesian CD's support the claim that animals inherently merit 
moral respect even if they cannot suffer? 
Given that we are engaged in the project of CD, our central task is to 
consider whether or not a theistic or fully Christian worldview properly 
coheres with the existence of evil. As a result, we can help ourselves to 
distinctively Christian claims when arguing for such coherence. In light 
of that, neo-Cartesian Christians can appeal to the fact that the Christian 
Scripture portrays the natural world as possessing intrinsic worth in vir-
tue of its status as a divine creation. Christian environmentalists have long 
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appealed to the fact that God creates, owns, and redeems the natural or-
der as evidence of its inherent moral worth. In creating the world, God 
declares it good even before human beings come on the scene to use it 
as an instrument or to exercise dominion over it (Genesis 1:28). Scripture 
contains repeated affirmations of God's ownership of creation (e.g., Psalm 
24:1). Finally, God is described both as entering into covenantal relation-
ships with the natural world and as engaged in the project of redeeming it 
(Genesis 9:8-17 and Romans 8:18-22). 
As a result, Christians are obliged to regard nature as having worth 
apart from its role in serving human ends. What sort of claim does the 
worth of the natural world place on human creatures? Critics of Chris-
tianity have often made the claim that the Judea-Christian scriptures ac-
cord human beings a dominion over nature (in Genesis 1:28) which has 
encouraged wanton environmental destruction. But claims of dominion 
are balanced by claims that human creatures are stewards of the created 
order. As a result, Christians are obliged to acknowledge a prima facie duty 
to safeguard the integrity of nature. Such a duty would undoubtedly pre-
clude pointless destruction of the environment as well as wanton disre-
gard for the integrity of animals. 
Grounding the moral worth of animals in the general worth of nature 
and its integrity requires more fleshing out than we can provide here. For 
example, one might wonder exactly what "preserving the integrity of the 
natural order" amounts to. Am I destroying the integrity of nature if I 
disrupt the smooth sandy surface of the beach with my foot, or if I swat a 
mosquito? Answers to these questions will have to be filled out via a de-
veloped account of the proper functioning of nature and its components. 
On such an account, interventions in nature will only count as violations 
of natural integrity if they serve to thwart the proper functioning of na-
ture or its components. This will explain why walking on the beach is 
not morally objectionable (though perhaps destroying erosion-protecting 
sand dunes would be). It will also explain why predation, a natural fea-
ture of the animal food chain, is not an evil (though perhaps trophy hunt-
ing would be). 
Nonetheless, the duty to safeguard the integrity of nature is only a 
prima facie duty, one which can be overridden in those cases where viola-
tions of that integrity are necessary or prudent for securing greater goods. 
Thus, it would be permissible for one to cut down a tree to secure shelter 
or to kill a fish for food. Some might object that this position is still not 
robust enough since it also fails to provide proper grounding for still fur-
ther moral judgments that we make concerning animals. For example, this 
view fails to explain why certain factory farming practices are morally 
objectionable. If it turns out that factory farming practices are much more 
efficient at producing an affordable human food supply than alternative 
practices, then this view seems to allow that such practices are morally 
permissible. One might be able to argue in favor of widespread deforesta-
tion by logging on similar grounds. 
However, our imaginary critic still has some work to do to make this 
objection stick. First, the critic's claim here is only problematic if we are 
convinced that factory farming, to use the first example, is always objec-
tionable. But our moral judgments about factory farming and logging 
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practices are typically far less robust than our judgments that there is 
something wrong with purposelessly beating a pet. Further, many would 
argue that if factory-farming practices can secure an adequate food sup-
ply with significantly greater efficiency that its impermissibility is not 
simply obvious. 
Second, even if such practices are objectionable, it might be the case 
that the moral objection can be sustained on alternative grounds. For ex-
ample, one might object to factory farming on Kantian grounds of the sort 
described above. Perhaps if such practices are wrong, their wrongness 
derives from the impact they are likely to have on those who carry out 
and are aware of them. In addition, some cases of this sort might be ruled 
out on still other, non-Kantian grounds. Thus, if over-fishing or defor-
estation will deplete resources necessary or useful for the well-being of 
future generations, such grounds might suffice for the wrongness of these 
destructive practices. 
VII. Conclusion 
The task of engaging the question of animal pain and suffering in the con-
text of CD is an urgent one, and one that requires serious attention on the 
part of reflective theists. In this essay we have aimed to show just how far 
one might be able to press one CD which had substantial currency in the 
seventeenth century, but which has fallen into disfavor recently. We have 
made the case that neo-Cartesians can endorse a variety of positions, at-
tributing a greater or lesser degree of mentality to animals, by drawing on 
contemporary resources in the philosophy of mind. We do not mean to 
argue that the positions we describe here are known to be true, or indeed 
that they are true at all. On the other hand, we take the position defended 
here to be something stronger than a mere defense. Rather, our claim is 
that we are not warranted or justified in rejecting these positions in light 
of our acceptances. Thus, since such neo-Cartesian views are "true for all 
we know" we are not in a position to assert that it is incompatible with 
the existence of God, nor that this apparent pain and suffering makes the 
existence of God unlikely.49 
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